Philosophical Mind Studies

Descartes as a Methodologist

July 5, 2008 · 1 Comment

Rene Descartes (156-1650) is one of the most important western philosophers. During his lifetime, he was famous as an original physicist, physiologist and mathematician. His pursuit of mathematical and scientific truth soon led to a profound rejection of the scholastic tradition in which he had been educated . Much of his work was concerned with the provision of a secure foundation for the advancement of human knowledge through the natural sciences. But he attempted to restart philosophy in a fresh direction. For example, he refused to accept the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition that had dominated philosophical thought throughout the medieval period. He attempted to fully integrate philosophy and theology and such a new direction for philosophy made him into a revolutionary figure. The philosophical writings for which he is remembered are extremely circumspect in their treatment of controversial issues. His work was influential although his studies in physics and the other natural sciences are much less than his mathematical and philosophical works. He was the founder of analytical geometry and the Cartesian co-ordinates; the name is derived form the Latin form of his name, Carteious.

 

Discourse on the Method, Optics, Geometry and Meteorology was published in French language. The Discourse contains a sketch of Descartes’ life and education together with a sort or summary of his philosophical and scientific position and basically it is the preface of the above said three scientific treatises. These scientific essays are presented as samples of what his method can accomplish. “He had the gift of  presenting complicated philosophical doctrines so elegantly that they appeared fully intelligible on first reading and yet still provide matter for reflection to the most advanced specialists”. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries Descartes ‘ philosophical ghost was always present. Locke, Hume, Leibniz and even Kant felt compelled to philosophical entanglement with this intellectual giant. For these reasons, Descartes is often called as the “father” of the modern philosophy.

 

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  • Desh Raj // December 17, 2008 at 9:55 am | Reply

    Philosophers are still busy at work trying to make sense of mental causation. Many criticize the assumptions on which the alleged problems of mental causation are predicated, particularly Kim’s formulation of the exclusion problem (Bennett 2003, Menzies 2003, Raymont 2003). Others enjoin us to accept those very positions that have been cast aside as unavailable, such as type physicalism (Hill 1991), or down-right implausible, such as epiphenomenalism (Bieri 1992, Chalmers 1996, ch.5).

    Some have even questioned whether we really have a problem concerning mental causation (Baker 1993, Burge 1993). Baker 1993 has argued that once the principles of physicalism are accepted, not only are we saddled with the exclusion problem, the problem is absolutely unsolvable. But, Baker continues, the wide-scale epiphenomenalism that would ensue were we to take the principles of physicalism seriously is tantamount to a reductio ad absurdum of the principles themselves, so we must reject the principles, in which case the exclusion problem dissolves of itself. Baker quite radically proposes that we reject the causal closure thesis if we wish to hold onto the possibility of mental causation – indeed, if we want to hold onto the possibility of macro-causation generally – a possibility that Baker claims is well testified by the successes of our explanatory practices.

    Antony 1991 as well as Kim 1993, however, have argued that the problem of mental causation is the problem of explaining how and why there is this explanatory success when it comes to explaining behavior in mental terms. That is, the problem does not go away by pointing out that our mentalistic explanations perform quite well. The puzzle is how they explain so well, given that the metaphysics all point to the causal irrelevance of the mental.

    There are, to be sure, other novel solutions in the making. But the ideal solution, given the multiplicity of the problems surrounding mental causation – the problem of anomalism, the problem of externalism, and the problem of exclusion – is one that can solve all the problems together, perhaps not with just one account that simultaneously solves all three, but maybe a patchwork account, each of whose components mutually support the others.

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