Methodology of the Research

The present research work is related to the same problem what is described in the previous section. Here we are going to discuss the nature of mind with special reference to Rene Descartes, David Hume and Gilbert Ryle. These three thinkers are also introduced in the historical section of the problem of the mind. All the thinkers, which will be discussed in the different chapters, are from different traditions i.e. Descartes is the founder of rationalism, Hume is the eminent scholar of empiricism and Ryle is one from the renowned analytical thinkers. Here is the hypothesis that all thinkers are failed to explain the real nature of mind, but all have a spirit of special expression of the issue that are also relevant in today’s philosophical world. In the forthcoming chapters, we will discuss it in detail.

 

Let’s discuss about the methodology. We have used analytical method as core method in this work. As we know a methodology is a system of principles and general ways of organising and structuring theoretical and practical activity, and also the theory of this system. Genetically methods go back far into the past, when our distant ancestors were acquiring, generalising and handing down to new generations their skills and means of influencing nature, the forms of organising labour and communication. As philosophy emerged, methodology became a special target of cognition and could be defined as a system of socially approved rules and standards of intellectual and practical activity. These rules and standards had to be aligned with the objective logic of events, with the properties and laws of phenomena. The problems of accumulating and transmitting experience called for a certain formalisation of the principles and precepts, the techniques and operations involved in activity itself. For example, in ancient Egypt geometry emerged in the form of methodologically significant precepts concerning the measuring procedure for the division of land. An important role in this process was played by training for labour operations, their sequence, and the choice of the most effective ways of doing things.

 

With the development of production, technology, art, and the elements of science and culture, methodology becomes the target of theoretical thought, whose specific form is the Philosophical comprehension of the principles of organisation and regulation of cognitive activity, its conditions, structure and content.

 

In Descartes’ the problem of methodology is central. Methodology is required to establish on what basis and by what methods new knowledge may be obtained. For Descartes the analysis of concepts was only a preparation for the construction of a system of knowledge based on certain ‘clear and distinct ideas’ obtained by analysis. Descartes worked out the rules of the rationalistic method, the first rule being the demand that only propositions that are clearly and distinctly comprehensible may be accepted as true. The first principle is  axiomatic knowledge, that is, ideas perceived intuitively by reason, without any proof. From these immediately perceived propositions new knowledge is deduced by means of deductive proof. This assumes the breaking down of complex problems into more specific and comprehensible problems and a strictly logical advance from the known to the unknown.

 

Another line in methodology was represented at this time by English empiricism, which sought to devise modes of thought that would help to build a strictly experimental science guided by proofs of scientific truths arrived at through induction. The limitations of both trends were revealed by German classical philosophy, which produced a searching analysis of the conditions of cognition, its forms and organising principles. In contrast to mechanistic methodology, which metaphysically interpreted the ways and means of cognition, classical German Philosophy developed a dialectical methodology in idealistic form.

 

Kant produced a critical analysis of the structure and types of man’s cognitive abilities and defined the constructive and regulative principles of cognition and the relationship between its form and content. Whereas Descartes’ initial methodological principle was to subject everything to doubt in order to obtain sound and unquestionably authentic knowledge and Hume had doubted the very fact of the existence of the world, for Kant a critical attitude to present knowledge was the methodological basis for overcoming dogmatic and metaphysical views of the world. His work was aimed against both dogmatism and scepticism and sought to defend the principle of the authenticity and general significance of knowledge. Dualism and apriorism however, prevented consistent realisation of this principle.

 

All the three thinkers discussed in this work are used analytical method. We can find Descartes’ method’s preliminary sketch in his book Discourse on the Method. Hume also used experimental method, in a sense it is development of analysis. But Ryle being as a logical positivist, has widely acknowledged for this analytical method. We will find some reflection on it in forthcoming chapters. Analysis has always been at the heart of philosophical method, but it has been understood and practiced in many different ways.  Perhaps, in its broadest sense, it might be defined as a process of isolating or working back to what is more fundamental by means of which something, initially taken as given, can be explained or reconstructed.  The explanation or reconstruction is often then exhibited in a corresponding process of synthesis.  This allows great variation in specific method however.  The aim may be to get back to basics, but there may be all sorts of ways of doing this, each of which might be called ‘analysis’.

 

The Greek word ‘analysis’ means the resolution of a complex whole into its parts as opposed to ’synthesis’, which means working into the construction of a whole out of parts.  Philosophers have always had two main aims, the construction of systems of Metaphysics, Logic or Ethics (synthesis) and the clarification of important ideas (analysis) these cannot always synthesis from one point of view is analysis from another.  Plato’s Republic, for example, may be considered as the construction in thought of a perfectly just society or as the analysis of the ideas of a just society.  Major part of Aristotle’s Ethics is concerned with the analysis of such important ideas as ‘voluntary action’, ‘virtue and vice’, ‘’pleasure’ etc.

 

In modern time Continental philosophy has tended to be synthetic and British philosophy to be analytic. From the beginning of the twentieth century the view that analysis is the distinguishing feature of philosophy was widely accepted in English-speaking countries.  Philosophers who follow this trend often have little in common with each other except the use of the word ‘analysis’ to describe their various activities.  The most that can be said is that they take the function of philosophy to be, not the acquisition of new knowledge (which is the function of the special sciences) but the classification and articulation of what we already know. 

 

Both analytical philosophy and phenomenology can be seen as developing far more sophisticated conception of analysis, which draws on but go beyond decompositional analysis. But it is important to see in the wider context of twentieth century methodological practices and debates for it is not just in ‘analytic’ philosophy despite its name-that analytic methods are accorded, a central role.  Phenomenology, in particular, contains its own distinctive set of analytic methods, with similarities and differences to those of analytic philosophy.  Phenomenological analysis has frequently been compared to conceptual clarification in the ordinary language tradition and the method of ‘phenomenological reduction’ that Husserll invented in 1905 offers a striking parallel to the reductive project opened up by Russell’s theory of descriptions, which also made its appearance in 1905.  Analytic Philosophy is ‘analytic’ much more in the sense that analytic geometry is ‘analytic’ than in the crude decompositional sense that Kant understood it.